ABSTRACT The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) have been designed to perform a more agile and efficient automation, control, and orchestration of future industrial systems while improving the energy efficiency in smart factories. Unfortunately, while the benefits of the IIoT are undeniable, their pervasive adoption as key enablers for future industries also paved the way for new security risks. In fact, the damaging effects of exploiting vulnerable IIoT have been repeatedly demonstrated and publicly reported. The Mirai botnet, various reports on hackable and invasive devices, alongside the infamous Stuxnet malware, constitute significant proof on the undisputed and disruptive effect of the malware-targeting IIoT systems. As a response, a plethora of solutions has been developed to address the issue of securing IIoT systems in specific sectors. Nevertheless, we believe that the gradual decay of the IIoT's physical dimension (e.g., the physical process), also called aging, is a natural component of the IIoT's life cycle, which has not received sufficient attention from the scientific community. This paper develops a methodology for detecting abnormal behavior in the context of aging IIoT. The approach leverages multivariate statistical analysis [e.g., principle component analysis (PCA)], alongside the Hotelling's T 2 statistics, and the univariate cumulative sum in order to detect abnormal process events. An innovative feature of the developed approach is the detection of stealth attacks attempting to influence the dataset in each age. The extensive experimental results on a continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) model demonstrate its applicability to the IIoT and its superior performance to the recently reported techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
The pervasive presence of sensing and actuation devices in our society has brought upon the creation of a smart world. Its key enabler, the Internet of Things (IoT), constitutes its backbone, which plays the role of the catalyst for the proliferation of innovative applications and scenarios such as smart homes, smart hospitals, and smart cities. More recently, a new initiative named Industry 4.0 [1] , [2] established the core principles for combining industrial systems, the Internet of Things (IoT), and Cloud Computing, into Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). By becoming a key enabler for the seamless merging of the physical and digital entities within networked industrial infrastructures, the IIoT is designed to
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While the IIoT continues to shape our present and promises to open new horizons for the future, it also raises considerable design and administrative challenges. Unlike traditional Information and Technology (IT) systems where cyber operations and their effects are generally limited to the cyber dimension, within IIoT, the effects of normal operations may cross the boundaries of the physical realm. To this end, normal IIoT actuation operations can have tangible physical repercussions in the case of malfunctioning and/or deliberate/accidental interventions.
Unfortunately, while the benefits of IIoT are undeniable, their pervasive adoption as key enablers for future industries also paved the way for new security risks [4] . The damaging effects of exploiting vulnerable IIoT have been repeatedly demonstrated and publicly reported. The Mirai botnet showed the magnitude and the global scale impact of an IoT-targeted attack [5] . The invasive dimension of such attacks was further demonstrated by the hacking of baby monitors [6] , and by the hackable cardiac devices from St. Jude [7] . In the IIoT domain, we first mention the infamous Stuxnet malware [8] , [9] , believed to be the first malware specifically designed to attack industrial installations. Its ability to rewrite the control logic of industrial hardware and more importantly, to hide its presence from system engineers, brought to light a new class of threats in which disturbances originating in the cyber domain can propagate to the physical realm. While Stuxnet was first reported almost a decade ago, even today researchers continue to dissect it and to learn from this complex cyberwarfare weapon [10] . Subsequently, the recently reported cyber-attacks targeting the Ukrainian electricity grid [11] , [12] demonstrated the exceptional impact of cyberphysical attacks, where an ordinary malware infection may leave vastly populated regions without electricity.
As a response to these growing threats and disruptive cyber attacks, several organizations developed principles and best practices for securing IIoT systems. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published a set of strategic principles for securing the IoT (and IIoT) [13] . The document stipulates that, while IIoT creates immense opportunities for our societies, IIoT security seems unable to keep up with the rapid evolution of this new domain. As a result, the DHS's document pin-points ''a set of non-binding principles and suggested best practices to build toward a responsible level of security''. Similar strategies have been undertaken for other directions and specific applications of IIoT including the automotive sector [14] .
Besides these, a plethora of solutions have been developed by the industry and academia, which have been particularly tailored to address the issue of securing IIoT systems in specific sectors, including smart homes, smart hospitals, smart transportation, and Industry 4.0 [15] - [18] . A considerable amount of research has focused on the development of intrusion/anomaly detection systems. Different strategies have been suggested by embracing diverse techniques such as classification [19] , [20] , multivariate statistical analysis, principal component analysis [21] , [22] , and data fusion [23] - [25] .
While previous research has indeed addressed several security issues in IIoT, a new round of research is needed in order to create innovative solutions particularly tailored to address the requirements of IIoT's life cycle. To this end, we believe that the gradual decay of the IIoT's physical dimension (e.g., the physical process), hereinafter also called aging, is a natural component of IIoT's life cycle, which has not received sufficient attention from the scientific community. In fact, while several reports have documented techniques for detecting the aging of industrial processes [26] , [27] , we believe that yet another level of sophistication needs to be considered in the development of effective and practical anomaly detection systems applicable to IIoT. In other words, the problem of designing security solutions for IIoT needs to be positioned in the context of aging IIoT. This paper formulates a paradigm shift in terms of developing security solutions for aging IIoT. Particularly, we develop a methodology for detecting abnormal behavior in the context of aging IIoT. The approach assumes that the IIoT's life cycle is split into distinct ages, where each age is defined as an operational time interval. Then, for each age, a model for the normal process behavior is constructed by leveraging principle component analysis. The anomaly detection index is based on Hotelling's T 2 statistics and the univariate cumulative sum. An innovative feature of the developed approach is the detection of attempts to influence the dataset in each age. For this purpose, the non-parametric cumulative sum is used. Furthermore, by leveraging multivariate process analysis, a salient feature of the developed methodology is its ability to detect stealthy attacks that cause minor process deviations by manipulating legitimate sensor data. Lastly, the paper demonstrates via extensive experimental results on a continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) model its applicability to IIoT and its superior performance to recently reported techniques.
Throughout this paper we make the following main contributions:
• We formulate a paradigm shift in terms of developing anomaly detection systems for IIoT by adding aging as a key process parameter.
• We develop an efficient anomaly detection methodology that uses the correlation among process variables in order to detect stealthy cyber attacks.
• We develop a simple, yet effective strategy aimed at detecting attempts to alter the dataset.
• We present extensive experimental results on a continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) model, and we demonstrate the superior performance of the developed approach against prior works. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of related studies. Section III provides the background for the developed approach, and it presents the details of the steps for detecting abnormal events in aging IIoT, as part of the developed methodology. Extensive experimental results are documented in Section IV. Here, we start by demonstrating the ability of the developed approach do detect stealthy cyber attacks in the non-aging and multi-aging scenarios. Then, in the same section, we continue with the assessment of its precision, and with the experimental comparison to related techniques. The paper concludes in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
In light of the aforementioned threats, there have been numerous attempts to address the security of IIoT. A considerable amount of research has been allocated to understanding the design of comprehensive anomaly detection systems for the industrial realm [28] . To this end, we observe that existing techniques can be categorized according to the scope of the monitored parameters. Accordingly, we can distinguish between: (i) process-specific detection methods, where the features exposed by the underlying industrial processes of IIoT constitute the input for the detection strategy; (ii) network intrusion detection systems, where the industrial traffic is closely monitored and used to signal an abnormal behavior; and (iii) hybrid detection techniques combining process-specific parameters with network intrusion detection techniques. Given that the approach documented in this paper is particularly tailored to detect anomalies in the behavior of the physical process, the analysis that follows focuses on similar studies.
We start with the work of Cárdenas et al. [29] , which demonstrated that, by incorporating knowledge on the physical process in the control loop, it is possible to detect traditional computer attacks that change the behavior of the underlying physical process. Consequently, by leveraging the knowledge on the physical process, the detection can focus on the attack target, rather than on the various strategies that an adversary may undertake. More recently, in [30] , Giraldo, et al., stepped further and designed an attackresilient controller. In terms of detection, [30] adopted the non-parametric cumulative sum model.
The work of Carcano et al. [31] and Fovino et al. [32] builds on the assumption that every attack on ICS will ultimately lead to a transition of the system from a secure state to a critical state. Critical state descriptions are created by process engineers and are used by detection engines to estimate the state of the process. Essentially, in their work, the authors elaborate a new critical state-based industrial firewall that blocks commands that would force the process to a critical state.
More recently, the applicability of data clustering techniques for anomaly detection was explored by the work of Kiss et al. [33] . The Gaussian mixture model was compared to the K-means clustering technique, and the superior performance of the former was demonstrated in the context of a chemical process. A similar attempt for the classification of different events was undertaken by Wang and Mao in [20] . Here, an ensemble of two models of one-class classification was developed. Its performance was demonstrated in the context of two industrial installations (an electric arc furnace and a wind tunnel) and several public datasets. In the direction of multivariate statistical analysis we find the work of Ha et al. [21] . Here, the multi-mode principal component analysis (PCA) was used together with the K-nearest neighbor algorithm for process monitoring and data classification. The approach was evaluated in the context of a mixed refrigeration physical process. In a similar direction, Portnoy et al. [22] developed a weighted adaptive recursive PCA approach for fault detection in a natural gas transmission pipeline. Conversely, Chen et al. [24] , aimed at reducing the size of the monitored parameter space with the help of a multisensor fusion strategy. The approach was tested in the context of state estimation of a small power network.
Especially in power systems, the problem of defending against cyber attacks received significant attention. Accordingly, Zhao et al. [34] , used the measurements from a limited number of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) in conjunction with a robust projection statistics to perform effective statistical consistency verification against measurements. In [35] , the secure state estimation problem was formulated as a nonconvex minimization problem. In the same work, the satisfiability modulo theory was used to derive a detection engine for the power system's abnormal behavior.
Lastly, we mention the recent work of Pilario and Cao [36] that is the closest to relate to the methodology developed in this paper. Pilario's work is mainly aimed at detecting incipient faults in industrial processes. The authors developed a multivariate statistical monitoring procedure named the canonical variate disimilarity analysis (CVDA). The authors developed a metric for detecting early process decay (e.g., aging), and a kernel density estimation for establishing the detection threshold. The approach was demonstrated in the context of a continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) model, presented in the same work [36] .
Compared to the previous works, the approach developed in this paper distinguishes itself from several perspectives. First, while several techniques have been developed to detect abnormal process behavior, these do not consider the level of sophistication addressed by the present study, namely that of aging IIoT. Then, as later demonstrated in this paper, while several previous techniques have been developed to detect process decay, these are not effective in the detection of anomalies caused by stealthy cyber attacks. Lastly, the approach developed in this paper also addresses the dataset construction phase in order to detect attempts to influence and to change the dataset in the preparation of future cyber attacks.
III. DEVELOPED APPROACH
Our methodology for detecting abnormal behavior in aging IIoT infrastructures leverages multivariate statistical analysis. It embraces the complexity of IIoT by focusing on the relationship between process variables (i.e., control and observation variables). Namely, instead of assuming the individual monitoring and analysis of process variables, it presumes existing correlations between variables. This addresses more complex settings, where, an attacker aiming at mounting a successful cyber stealth attack [37] , would need to alter several correlating variables in order to completely blind the operators. In a practical scenario, the intruder would need to compromise the communication flows associated to all the correlating variables, to manipulate all the associated flows, while ensuring that his presence is not revealed.
This section provides a systematic presentation of the developed approach. It starts by presenting the background in terms of techniques adopted from the field of statistical analysis. It then proceeds to the presentation of the developed approach. VOLUME 7, 2019 A. BACKGROUND 1) PCA FOR STATISTICAL MONITORING Principle component analysis (PCA) is often used to reduce the dimension of data, being mainly aimed at reducing the complexity of the data exploration and analysis. It focuses on the covariance-variance of measurements and provides an explanation on the relationship between variables via a new (reduced) set of variables. The ''principal'' components are essentially functions, or more specifically, linear combinations of the original variables.
More formally, let us consider X a matrix of m random
is a column vector of n observations. Before proceeding with the computation of the PCA model, X needs to be normalized to zero mean and unit variance. The normalized matrix is denoted byX. Next, the covariance matrix, , is defined as:
The PCA then proceeds with the computation of the eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors for such that:
In the equation above,
is a m × m diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues positioned on the diagonal and ordered decreasingly (i.e., λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ . . . ≥ λ m ). In the same equation, U is the matrix of eigenvectors for the covariance matrix . The projection of a new set of normalized measurementsX onto the PCA space reduces to the following equation:
Lastly, the dimensionality reduction is performed by retaining only the first l largest principal components (PC), that is, the selection of the PC (i.e., the largest eigenvalues). The PC describe most of the data variance, and are able to capture most of the systematic process behavior. Conversely, the remaining m−l components capture the noise component and denote the residual space. Let U l andŨ l denote the matrices of retained principal components, and of residuals, respectively. Furthermore, let l and˜ l denote the eigenvalues associated to principal components and to residuals, respectively.
2) HOTELLING'S T 2 STATISTIC
Hotelling's T 2 statistic [38] is one of the most familiar procedures for multivariate process monitoring. It is a generalization of the Student's t-statistic for multivariate hypothesis testing. In the paper at hand, the T 2 statistic is applied on the projection of observations onto the PCA model. The T 2 will then essentially compute the statistical distance to the center of the dataset.
Assuming a normalized observation vectorX , and its projection onto the PCA space S =X U, then Hotelling's T 2 computed on the PC is given by:
Essentially, the T 2 test defines the Mahalanobis distance to the center of a reference distribution. For monitoring and anomaly detection purposes, when the value of the T 2 test exceeds a certain threshold value T 2 α at significance level α, an anomaly is reported. The computation of the threshold value is performed by analyzing the probability distribution of anomaly-free data [39] .
3) THE UNIVARIATE CUMULATIVE SUM
Univariate cumulative sum (UCUSUM)-based approaches have been known to provide an efficient solution for detecting the gradual change of the monitored variables. They have been first proposed in [40] , and presume one change-point in the mean value of the recorded time series. However, they are also capable of detecting small changes by accumulating the deviations from several samples.
The simplest form of a UCUSUM is the one that records the changes in the parameters of an independent random series X . In this case it is presumed that the parameter µ 0 (the mean value) is a reference value computed in a disturbancefree scenario. The UCUSUM at time i is then defined as:
where CS 0 = 0. According to equation above, the change is detected when CS i > h, where h is the detection threshold.
B. DEVELOPED APPROACH
The developed approach has two distinct phases: (i) data acquisition; and (ii) anomaly detection. We presume that time is split into ages. An age represents a specific period in time in which the behavior of instances of the same physical process are statistically consistent (e.g., mean and standard deviation for the process variables). In this scenario we consider that IIoT systems periodically publish measurements in the form of time series. The data is analyzed (e.g., against possible abnormalities), and it is added to the set of measurements corresponding to a particular age. This way, the dataset is continuously expanded with additional measurements.
1) DATASET CONSTRUCTION
As noted earlier, the determination of the IIoT process age is an intrinsic requirement for a high detection precision. For this purpose the first step in the developed methodology is the initial dataset construction, which is then enriched with additional measurements from various IIoT reports. Let us presume A to be the initial set of ages. This initial set is determined in a laboratory environment, where IIoT process measurements are first recorded. As new measurements are available for other instances of the same IIoT process, the new set of measurements are compared to the previous ones. For this purpose, we leverage Hotelling's T 2 statistics to determine the distance of newly projected measurements from the center of the age's distribution (according to the age of the previous measurements). If significant deviations are observed (based on the computed T 2 distances), a new age is created and added to A. Next, let T 2 a denote the set of computed distances for a particular age a ∈ A. Then, once a new IIoT instance is made available, its closest age is approximated by comparing the reported measurements distances to the reports found in each of the available ages according to the following equation:
Next, we formally define the procedure for building the dataset in a particular age according to the measurements reported by various IIoT instances. Let R denote the set of sources that regularly publish measurement data (e.g., the set of IIoT instances), and let r ∈ R denote an element of R. We then presume that each IIoT instance periodically publishes measurements consisting of m variables. Then, for a particular age a, let X a denote the matrix of aggregated measurements consisting of m random variables, U la the selected principal components for the PCA model computed over age a, and S a the projection of measurements X a to the PCA space. Considering that our aim is to detect changes against a given set of measurements, we leverage Hotelling's T 2 statistics. To this end, for a given age a, T 2 a denotes the set of distances of projected measurements compared to the center of the distribution. For each new set of measurements, in case an anomaly is not detected, T 2 a is extended with the T 2 distances of the newly computed projections.
2) ANOMALY DETECTION
An important aspect in the construction of the dataset is the detection of attempts to shift the center of the dataset via deviations that do not account as anomalies (e.g., stealthy attempts to shift the dataset). Because the distribution of the measurements in terms of average and deviation is not known apriori for a particular age (i.e., in case sufficient measurements are not available yet to compute the PCA model for the current age), the non-parametric cumulative sum (NCUSUM) is used for this purpose. For each new set of measurements originating from a particular source r, two statistics are computed, namely, SHD + ri to detect a local maximum, and SHD − ri to detect a local minimum. The two statistics are computed recursively on the PCA projection (for the closest age for which a PCA model has been constructed according to Eq. (6)), and namely, on the computed T 2 distances, denoted as T 2 r as follows: (8) where avg() is a function that returns the average of the given dataset. According to these equations, a shift is detected in case either SHD
where h is the detection threshold. We presume that SHD + r0 = 0, and SHD − r0 = 0. A second significant aspect in the anomaly detection phase is the actual detection of abnormal reports. We observe that, while the use of T 2 may certainly reveal larger outliers, the exclusive use of this approach is not suitable for the detection of minor behavioral changes (e.g., stealthy attacks). For this purpose we use the UCUSUM approach. Accordingly, the UCUSUM is computed for each report originating from each source. More specifically, we compute the UCUSUM for each individual set of T 2 r published by each source r as follows:
where AD r0 = 0. An anomaly is detected when AD ri > h, where h is a threshold parameter. The value of h is computed by leveraging its standard deviation σ , such that h = 3σ , which means that 99.7% of values fall within the ''normal'' distribution.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
A prototype of the developed approach was implemented in Matlab. This section provides a presentation of the experimental results used for validating the developed methodology. It starts with the presentation of the physical process, and it proceeds to the presentation of the detection capabilities in the non-aging and multi-aging scenarios. The section also includes significant experimental results on the precision of the methodology, and experimental comparison against recent techniques.
A. PHYSICAL PROCESS
The developed methodology is evaluated in the context of the closed-loop continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) case study. The model that is used for this purpose is the one developed by Pilario and Cao [36] , particularly designed for detecting aging in industrial processes. The CSTR model is the one of a jacketed tank that carries out an exothermic firstorder reaction. The process includes three inputs, namely the inlet flow rate C i , inlet temperature T i , and the inlet coolant temperature T ci . The process outputs are: the outlet flow rate C, the outlet temperature T , the outlet coolant temperature T c , and the coolant flow rate Q c . Figure 1 shows the structure of the CSTR model, including its input and output variables. The model includes a controller that maintains the reactor temperature T by manipulating the coolant flow rate Q c . Most importantly, however, Pilario and Cao's model includes two additional parameters that permit the simulation of catalyst decay, and the simulation of heat transfer decay. The two parameters are multiplied in the process's equation in order to simulate process aging. For additional details regarding the CSTR model the reader is kindly instructed to consult [36] .
Next, the operation of the CSTR model under normal conditions is illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 . In Figure 2 we observe a sample of the model inputs running over 1200 min. The figure shows the behavior of the process in the presence of a random perturbation that is applied to the model's input in order to trigger the model's internal dynamics. The output of the CSTR process is visualized in Figure 3 . Here, besides the output, the figure also depicts the changes in the model's behavior in the case of simulated aging. To this end, we simulated an aging of 15% starting at 500 min, and an aging of 30% starting at 900 min. However, the challenge addressed in the paper at hand is the detection of abnormal events (e.g., cyber attacks) in the presence of decaying processes. The effectiveness of the methodology developed in this paper is demonstrated in the sections that follow.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND SETUP
A prototype of the developed approach was implemented in Matlab. For the present case study, the X matrix, that is, the input to the PCA model, consisted of seven variables: the three inputs and the four outputs. Next, based on the analysis of the data obtained from running the CVDA for 10 times, we have found that five principle components are needed to explain 95% of the variance in the data. Considering the high number of components that are needed to explain the data, throughout our experiment we used the full set of components (i.e., all seven components). These were selected in order to ensure that the precision of the detection is not affected by the reduction of the components. Furthermore, this design choice was also motivated by the attack types that the approach is targeting, namely, cyber stealth attacks that can leverage minor parameter changes in order to cause certain damages/alterations to the physical process.
C. ATTACK DETECTION IN THE NON-AGING SCENARIO
In the next phase of the assessment we demonstrate the detection capabilities of the developed approach in the case of a scenario consisting of a single IIoT instance, without aging. The purpose of the scenario is to show the detection capabilities in case of two distinct attacks: (i) a disruptive sensor bias attack; and (ii) a stealthy replay attack. The detection threshold h = 3σ was computed apriori based on previously recorded measurements. Here, σ denotes the standard deviation of AD ri values computed in disturbancefree conditions. The 3σ threshold was set to ensure that 99.7% of data will fall within the normal distribution.
At first, we observe the computed T 2 a values, and that of AD ri in Figure 4 . In this case we illustrated the operation under normal conditions where a new sets of measurements were continuously projected to a previously computed PCA model. Here, we observe that the approach is operating properly and no anomalous state is signaled.
Moving forward, we simulated a sensor bias against C i (the inlet flow rate). The bias is a progressive additive change on the value of C i that was started at 1000 min and lasted 200 min (i.e., until the end of the simulation). It is important to note that in Pilario and Cao's model the biased value is not fed back to the process controller, but it is accounted as a measurement sensor bias. As demonstrated by the results in Figure 5 , even if the attack is not clearly visible in the measurements of C i , the disturbance has a dramatic impact on the projected T 2 a , and, ultimately, on AD ri . This is because the attack affects the correlation between process variables. As a result, the newly biased values exhibit a different correlation, and, once the new set of measurements are projected to the PCA model, the new T 2 a values exhibit significant deviations from the ones recorded in the past. Consequently, immediately after the attack is started, it is detected by the developed approach, and it causes a significant increase in the value of AD ri .
Lastly, in the second attack scenario we simulated a replay attack against variable Q c (coolant flow rate). Once again, the attack was aimed to be stealthy, and to hide the operation of the process by replaying previous measurements from the past. For this purpose we replayed 200 minutes of measurements from the past at 600 min into the simulation. The result is shown in Figure 6 . Here, we observe that the attack is not visible by simple observation. However, by projecting the measurements onto the PCA model, and by subsequently computing the T 2 a value, the attack is immediately brought to the surface. As a result, the value of AD ri exhibits a significant change, and the attack is clearly detected.
D. ATTACK DETECTION IN THE MULTI-AGING SCENARIO
In the next phase of the assessment we applied the developed technique in the multi-aging scenario. We presumed 8 distinct infrastructure ages, such that each age progressively increases the decay of the process by 5%. In each age we presumed that reports are received from 10 distinct processes. For a particular age, while the dataset for that age was being constructed, each set of measurements was projected to the PCA model computed in the previous age in order to detect abnormal behavior. In parallel, for each new set of measurements, the shift of the center of the dataset for that particular age was also computed, namely the values of SHD + ri , and SHD − ri . Recall that this later procedure is particularly useful in the detection of attempts to shift the dataset for a particular age (i.e., while planning future attacks).
1) ANOMALY DETECTION IN THE DATASET CONSTRUCTION PHASE
The procedure for monitoring the dataset construction in each particular age is illustrated in Figure 7 . As shown here, for each age we depicted the shift in the dataset center by VOLUME 7, 2019 Next, the attempt to manipulate the dataset and to shift its center in a particular age is illustrated in Figure 8 . Here, the focus was placed on the 10-15% age window, where the figure shows the reports (in time) and the impact on the dataset in terms of center shift. We assumed that four subsequent reports are received that contain 100 minutes of replayed sensor data (e.g., non-correlating data). By leveraging the previous values for SHD + ri and SHD − ri the developed approach obtains their mean and standard deviation, and uses the threshold h = 3σ in order to decide the abnormality of the new measurements. As depicted in Figure 8 , the approach successfully detects the attempt to shift the center of the dataset in all four cases. As a result, the reports are ignored and are not added to the dataset. Note that this approach is particularly useful in the case that a full dataset is not available for computing the PCA model of the current age. This is a salient feature in the developed methodology that can be used to take decisions and validate new measurements, while not having a fully available PCA model. Obviously, in case a PCA model is available for the given age, then that particular PCA model can be used to validate the new measurements.
2) ANOMALY DETECTION IN NEW MEASUREMENTS
Next, we focus the analysis on the detection of stealthy attacks in the case of new measurements. For this purpose we use the replay attack against Q c , as described earlier in this section. We presume that reports are received for a process with 17% catalyst decay. In case sufficient measurements have been received in this age, then the attack detection can proceed with the PCA model for that particular age. This is the case of the attack demonstrated earlier (see IV-C). However, we presume that a PCA model was not computed for this age due to insufficient measurement reports. In this case the projection of the measurements needs to be performed on the PCA model from the nearest age. For our example the projection is performed on the PCA model computed for the 10-15% age. The result is shown in Figure 9 . Here, we observe that, for the given projection, the attack is clearly detected by the developed approach.
An important aspect that needs to be observed for the developed approach is the significant role for the selection of the aging period against which the projection is performed. For this purpose we have repeated the previous experiment and we projected the measurements with the same attack on PCA models computed for different ages. The results are shown in Figure 10 . Here, we observe that, according to the computed threshold, the precision of the detection in terms of true positives and false positives (extensively discussed in the following section) is significantly affected with the age to which the measurements are projected to. To this end, we observe that the closer the age against which the projection is performed, the more accurate the result (in terms of true positives). In the extreme case we see that if the projection is performed against 0% aging, then almost the complete measurement is classified as an attack. However, by selecting an age that is closer to the one in which the measurement was performed, the precision of the attack is significantly increased.
E. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
We further analyzed the sensitivity of the developed approach in terms of true positive rates (TPR) and false positive rates (FPR). The assessment focused on the two scenarios discussed in the previous sections, namely: the detection sensitivity in the non-aging scenario, and in the multi-aging scenario.
In the first scenario we focused on the sensitivity of the approach to the attack scale. Considering that the approach is particularly designed to detect stealthy attacks that exploit the normal operation of processes, we leverage the replay attack against variable Q c (i.e., the coolant flow rate). At first, we recorded 100 executions of the process under normal operating conditions, and we computed the PCA model, as well as the detection threshold h. Next, during subsequent simulations we applied the replay attack against variable Q c by gradually increasing the replayed measurement window from 1 minute to 100 minutes in step sizes of 2 minutes. For each replayed attack the experiment was repeated 50 times. Overall, 2500 experiments were conducted for this purpose.
With respect to the TPR, the results have been summarized in Figure 11 . Considering that the approach was particularly aimed at stealthy attacks, the rate of true positives increases with the duration of the attack. Particularly, in the case of a 10 minute attack, the recorded TPR was of 47%, which is a notable result considering that the model's execution step is of 1 minute. In other words, the approach can already detect deviations from the normal behavior with only 10 samples of measurements. By further increasing the attack duration, the TPR increases above 90% for attacks lasting more than 50 minutes, and up to 100% for attacks of longer duration. We note that the oscillating TPR values that have been obtained are mainly owed to the particular characteristics of the CSTR model that was used in this study, which, as previously mentioned, includes random noise in order to simulate more realistic operating conditions.
With respect to the FPR, in order to better understand the results, we analyzed the computed AD ri . In order to assess the FPR, 200 attack-free experiments have been conducted with the CSTR model. For each experiment the measurements have been projected against the previously computed PCA model. Furthermore, the value of AD ri was computed and was compared against the detection threshold h. For illustration purposes we leverage two distinct threshold values, namely h 1 = 3σ , which means that 99.7% of computed AD ri fall within the normal distribution, and a more restrictive threshold of h 2 = 5σ , which denotes abnormal behavior that is outside the typical distribution. The computed value for AD ri and the two thresholds are depicted in Figure 12 . According to our computations, the FPR = 1.37% in the case of h 1 , which decreases significantly to 0.25% in the case of h 2 . Here, we observe that, while the process already includes random noise in order to simulate realistic operational conditions, the developed approach exhibits a notable level of FPR of 1.37%, which decreases even further in case the detection threshold is adjusted.
Next, we analyzed the sensitivity of the developed approach in terms of TPR and FPR, in the case of the multiaging scenario. For this purpose we prepared the PCA models for the CSTR process for 21 distinct ages corresponding to 0% and up to 20% process decay (i.e., catalyst decay). For each age, measurements were collected for 100 process runs, and the detection parameters were computed. Next, the CSTR model age was set to 20% catalyst decay and an attack was launched by replaying 100 minutes of measurements for Q c . The experiment was repeated 50 times and the results were mapped against the PCA model corresponding to each age. The TPR was then computed by measuring the number of successful attack detections by considering only the cases in which before and after 100 minutes the attack duration, no attack was reported (e.g., the detection threshold of 3σ was not exceeded). Conversely, the FPR was computed only on the measurements recorded outside the attack period.
The results for this case have been summarized in Figure 13 . As expected, the closest the age against which the comparison is performed, the higher the value of the TPR. Here, we observe that the TPR reached more than 90% in case the measurements were mapped against a process with only 1% age difference. Furthermore, the results are promising also in case the comparison is performed against larger age differences. However, as the age difference increases, the TPR drastically decreases as well. After an age difference of 9%, the TPR reduces down to 0%. In the case of the FPR we observe the reverse effect of the age difference. As shown in the same figure, the FPR increases from 0.46% for 0% difference, to more than 80% for 9% age difference, while exceeding 90% if the age difference is larger than 12%.
F. EXPERIMENTAL COMPARISON TO RELATED WORKS
We focused on the comparison of the developed approach against the recent canonical variate dissimilarity analysis (CVDA) [36] methodology. The rationale for this is that Pilario and Cao's approach to detect incipient faults was particularly designed to detect abnormal behavior in industrial processes. Most importantly, Pilario and Cao used the same CSTR model to validate the CVDA approach as the one used in this work.
Briefly, CVDA is a linear dimensionality reduction technique that finds the maximum correlation between past (e.g., the training data), and future data. As a result, the CVDA is claimed to detect small shifts by verifying how well future values are predictable from measurements taken in the past. Essentially, the CVDA is an extension of the canonical variate analysis (CVA) [27] . It starts by building the sample covariance and cross-covariance matrices, and it applies the singular value decomposition (SVD) to find linear combinations with maximum correlations. Next, it applies the projection matrices obtained from the previous step to find the canonical variables C p , and C f , which are used to distinguish normal from faulty process states. The approach then leverages the T 2 and Q statistics together with a kernel density estimation function to estimate the probability distribution and to detect abnormal process behavior. Lastly, the CVDA proceeds with the construction of a new process canonical variate dissimilarity index D k that combines the T 2 and Q statistics obtained from past data with future data. For a detailed mathematical description the reader is kindly instructed to consult Pilario and Cao's paper on CVDA [36] .
At first, we constructed a dataset of measurements by running the CSTR model 100 times. Then, we applied the methodology developed in this paper to compute the PCA model and to compute the detection thresholds (h 1 = 3σ and h 2 = 5σ ). Furthermore, we applied the CVDA approach and computed the reference D k , and its detection thresholds (h 1 = 3σ and h 2 = 5σ ). The CVDA approach was implemented in Matlab according to the equations and parameter values documented in [36] .
We start the analysis with two examples to showcase the comparison of the two techniques. We implemented a stealthy attack against the CSTR model by replaying 30 minutes of measurements of the Q c variable from the past starting with minute 600 into the simulation. Unfortunately, as shown in Figure 14 , the CVDA was unable to detect this attack. However, the CVDA exposed a large false positive early into the simulation, which exceeded the second threshold of h 2 = 5σ . Conversely, the replay attack was clearly detected by our approach. As depicted in Figure 15 , our approach precisely detected the replay attack and maintained the detection level above the h 1 threshold for more than 100 min. This would provide enough time for engineers to observe the attack, to intervene, and troubleshoot. Nevertheless, we observe that our approach also detected a false positive early in the process execution. However, compared to the CVDA, the anomaly was only briefly reported and it did not exceed the second threshold (i.e., h 2 ).
In order to further examine the distinct behavior of the two approaches, we increased the attack size to a 60 min replay interval. In this case we observed that the CVDA was also able to detect the attack (see Figure 16 ). However, the attack was only briefly reported, and it was accompanied by two false positives, both exceeding the h 2 = 5σ threshold. Conversely, as illustrated by Figure 17 our methodology clearly detected the attack and it maintained the output above the second detection threshold for a longer period of time.
Next, we focused on the comparison of TPR and FPR for the two approaches. For assessing the TPR, we repeated the experiment described earlier, namely, we recorded 100 executions of the attack-free process, and we computed the detection parameters for both approaches. Then, we applied a replay attack against variable Q c by gradually increasing the replayed measurements from 1 minute to 100 minutes. Each experiment was repeated 50 times. The results have been summarized in Figure 18 . The results are consistent with our previous report on the TPR for the approach presented in this paper. However, in the same figure we also notice that the CVDA is not necessarily sensitive to the attack magnitude, while its detection rate is also much lower than the TPR recorder for our approach. This is mainly explained by the fact that our approach leverages the cumulative sum, which accumulates small process deviations, while the CVDA encapsulates both the T 2 and Q statistics. These do not accumulate the small deviations that may be caused by a stealthy attack, and, therefore are not capable to effectively detect such attacks.
The superior performance of the developed approach was further confirmed by the computation of the FPR for the CVDA. Accordingly, we ran 200 attack-free experiments, and we computed the D k index for each experiment. The results were then compared against the previously learned D k values and detection thresholds, and have been summarized in Figure 19 . Unfortunately, as shown here, the CVDA exhibits a large FPR. Our measurements have shown large outliers, recording a FPR of 2.56% for h = 3σ , and a FPR of 0.72% for h = 5σ . Recall that the FPR for the approach developed in this work was of 1.37% for h = 3σ , and 0.25% for h = 5σ , which means that the CVDA exhibits a FPR almost twice as large as the FPR of the approach presented in this paper. VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 18. Comparison of TPR between the approach proposed in this work and CVDA [36] . FIGURE 19. FPR of CVDA [36] . Measured results: FPR = 2.56% for h = 3σ , and FPR = 0.72% for h = 5σ .
G. DISCUSSION
As documented in this section, the developed approach is particularly useful to detect minor changes in the operation of the physical process. Since the methodology leverages correlations between process variables in order to build the ''normal'' operating model under a particular age, any changes in the correlation matrix can trigger the approach to signal significant deviations. As it turns out, this approach fits well into detecting subtle attacks in which case the attacker has the ability to remain in a stealth state (i.e., not to be detected) during the execution of a cyber attack. In general, the stealthiness refers to the communications, to the execution of the attack, and to the propagation of the impact of the attack [37] .
While in the presence of such attacks, as demonstrated in this section, the developed methodology is able to successfully signal such attacks. Furthermore, the high level of true positives (i.e., over 90% in case of 40 data samples), and the low false positive rate (i.e., 1.37%) are clear indicators of the fact that the developed methodology is promising in terms of applicability to IIoT. In terms of the type of detected attacks, we have mainly focused the discussion on few attack cases for ensuring clarity of presentation. However, considering that the approach builds on a model that integrates all input and output variables, as well as their correlations, any changes to the correlation among these variables will be detected. Therefore, the approach is not only capable of detecting replay attacks, but also other types of attacks such as: (i) classical Denial of Service attack, which would stop certain variables from being updated; (ii) integrity attacks, in which case the variable values would be changed by the attacker; and (iii) random variable attacks, in which case the attacker would inject random variable values in order to cause malfunctioning.
In terms of comparison to the state of the art, the details presented in the related work section have illustrated that the present work distinguishes itself first of all from addressing a new topic in the field of anomaly detection (i.e., anomaly detection in the context of aging IIoT). On the other hand, the experimental comparison detailed in this section was focused on Pilario and Cao's CVDA approach since their work is one of the most recent ones to address the aging aspect in industrial processes. Furthermore, there are many similarities between the present work and that of Pilario and Cao. More specifically, in both cases the input to the model is the set of inputs and outputs. Then, in both cases a correlationbased model is used in order to detect anomalies. Lastly, Pilario and Cao's approach was validated with the same CSTR model, which, thanks to the authors, is publicly accessible to the scientific community. Nevertheless, we underline that, as demonstrated by the results, while Pilario and Cao's work is promising in terms of detecting aging IIoT, it does not seem to be as effective in detecting abnormal behavior in the case of cyber stealth attack.
Lastly, we note that as future work, we intend to implement the developed methodology in a real case scenario for the automotive sector. The methodology is ultimately intended to detect tampering with the physical processes in passenger cars and trucks. For this purpose, additional research is needed in order to reduce the complexity of the implementation, to ensure the real-time execution of the data gathering, analysis and detection procedures.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We developed a methodology for detecting abnormal events in aging industrial Internet of Things (IIoT). The approach adds another level of sophistication to existing methodologies by taking into account the aging dimension of the physical process in IIoT. For each age category a principle component analysis (PCA) model is constructed, which is then used to compare new measurements and to detect abnormal events. The detection strategy leverages Hotelling's T 2 statistics and the univariate cumulative sum in order to detect small deviations from the normal behavior. Besides this aspect, the main novelty of the approach lies in the dataset construction, and the detection of attempts to shift the dataset via specially forged measurements. For this purpose the nonparametric cumulative sum was adopted, which provides early alerts for attempts to shift the dataset before a PCA model is made available for the current age. A salient feature of the developed methodology is its ability to detect subtle attack (e.g., stealthy attacks) that cause minor changes to the process operation by leveraging legitimate commands. This is accomplished by leveraging the features of the PCA, which can pin-point changes in the covariance of process variables. Extensive experimental results in the context of a continuous stirred-tank reactor (CSTR) model demonstrated the feasibility, and the high precision, alongside the superior performance of the developed methodology while compared to the state of the art.
Lastly, we believe that this work promotes a new paradigm for the field of anomaly detection by opening a new direction where process decay (i.e., aging) can significantly affect the precision of anomaly detection techniques. Consequently, existing detection methodologies should be evaluated for their ability to detect abnormal events in the case of aging infrastructures. In this scenario, the present work can also be viewed more as a general framework where the actual detection strategy can be replaced by other techniques that might prove to be more effective for other IIoT systems.
